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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
BETH M. WARDELL, 
Plaintif !-Appellant, 
vs. 
HARVEY R. JERMAN, and 
DAVID A. JERMAN, 
a minor, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
Case No. 
10554 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
The appellant, a passenger in and owner of a 
motor vehicle involved in an intersection collision 
in which suit was brought for personal injuries, 
appeals from a jury verdict of the District Court 
of the Third Judicial District finding no cause of 
action. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The appellant filed a complaint against Harvey 
R. Jerman and David A. Jerman, a minor, alleging 
that she sustained injuries as the result of an acci-
1 
dent on March 20, 1964, in Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah. The accident occurred in the vicinity of 
3190 South 7th East. At the Pre-Trial, it was ad-
mitted between the parties that the accident oc-
curred when the vehicle driven by David A. Jerman 
and the vehicle in which the appellant was riding 
collided at 3190 South 7th East in Salt Lake County. 
Harvey R. Jerman, the father of David A. Jerman, 
was sued as a party defendant because he author-
ized the issuance of a license to his minor son. Trial 
was had on February 2nd and 3rd of 1965. A gen-
eral jury verdict, in favor of defendants, of no cause 
of action was returned. A motion for new trial was 
filed and on January 10, 1966, it was denied. This 
appeal followed. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondents assert that the judgment en· 
tered on the jury's verdict finding "no cause of 
action" on behalf of appellant should be sustained. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The respondents submit the following state-
ment of facts as being more in accord with the 
actual status of the record, and the principle con· 
sistently stated by this Court, that on appeal the 
facts are to be viewed in a light most favorable 
to the decision of the trial court. 
The appellant's Exhibit 9, which was admitted 
into evidence, is a diagram map showing the inter· 
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section of Springview Drive and 7th East Street. 
Seventh East Street runs north and south and 
Springview Drive runs east and west. It does not 
perpendicularly traverse 7th East, but enters from 
the east further to the north than it leaves 7th East 
on the west. There are three lanes northbound on 
7th East Street, in addition to a left-turn lane at 
Springview Drive. There are four southbound lanes 
on 7th East Street, in addition to a left-turn lane 
to allow a left surn easterly onto Springview Drive. 
The collection lane for the left-turn lane going south 
is approximately three-quarters of a block in length 
( R. 155), whereas the left-turn collection lane for 
a turn west onto Springview Drive is considerably 
shorter. 
The appellant, Beth M. Wardell, operator of 
a small mink ranch ( R. 136) had four children by 
a p1·evious marriage, and at the time of the acci-
dent was married to Harold 0. Wardell, who was 
driving the automobile ( R. 118-120). The autmo-
bile was owned by Mrs. Wardell and registered in 
he1· name ( R. 118, 159), although Mr. Wardell testi-
fied that he was paying for it (R. 160-161). How-
ever, Mrs. Wardell obtained the loan herself with 
which to buy the vehicle, and signed the contract 
(R. 161, 162, 194). Additionally, she indicated in 
her deposition that the car was hers and that she 
bought it (Depo. P.26, R. 169-170), and Mr. War-
dell stated in his deposition that he was driving a 
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car which belonged to his wife when the accident 
occurred (Depo. P.31, R. 170-171). 
She signed the contract for the purchase of 
the vehicle, having made arrangements for the 
purchase of the automobile at a time when her 
husband was out of town (R. 193, 194). She drove 
to town, got out of the car to go into Western Union 
and then got back in the car and her husband drove 
her home (R. 195, 196). With reference to her 
husband taking over the driving, she stated (R. 
136): 
"When I got out of the car at the corner of 
the Wes tern Union to go in and send the wire 
he then slid over and drove and found a park-
ing place." 
At the time she started to drive into town, her hus· 
band was a passenger ; she was already in the car 
(R. 200). 
Mrs. Wardell drove her car from her home in 
Draper, Utah, to Salt Lake City, to send a birthday 
gift of money to her eldest son, who was in the 
l\'.I:arine Corps (R. 118). Mr. Wardell at first de· 
clined to accompany his wife to Salt Lake City 
and then decided to go along ( R. 158). Mr. 
Wardell drove on the return trip (R. 159), 
and was driving at the time of the accident. Mrs. 
Wardell was seated in the passenger seat and their 
small son was standing between them (. 119). There 
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was no evidence that Mr. Wardell was on business 
of his own. 
Mrs. Wardell testified at trial that she saw 
the vehicle driven by the defendant David A. J er-
man in the left-hand turn lane approximately 15 
to 20 feet in front of the Wardell vehicle before the 
accident (R. 120). However, at the time of her 
deposition, she stated that she had seen the adverse 
vehicle turning into the left-hand turn lane prior 
to its making the turn, and had seen it when it 
started to turn left to go onto Springview Drive 
(Depo. P. 7, R. 137-139), and that she thereafter 
did not see the defendant's vehicle until just be-
fore the accident. 
Officer Elwood Sheppard, a Salt Lake County 
Deputy Sheriff, investigated the accident ( R. 149). 
He testified that the accident occurred at about 
6 :44 p.m. on March 20, 1964, at approximately dusk 
( R. 156-157). He found extensive front-end damage 
to the Wardell vehicle and that the right side near 
the right door and fender of the pickup truck driven 
by defendant Jerman was damaged ( R. 151). He 
had a conversation with the defendant Jerman at 
the scene of the accident (R. 151), who said 
that he had looked down the road, saw the War-
dell vehicle with its left turn signal on and thought 
that it was going to turn left onto Springview Drive 
( R. 153). He then made a left turn and was struck 
broadside (R. 153). The space between the raised 
islands and collection lanes was 129 feet (R. 154, 
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Pls. Exhibit 9). The point of impact was substanti-
ally to the south side of the intersection between 
7th East and Springview Drive and approximately 
in the center on the west side of 7th East (See Ex-
hibit P.9). Officer Sheppard observed the only skid 
marks were three feet in length left by the right 
front tire of the Wardell vehicle ( R. 151 ) . The J er-
man vehicle had its lights on (R. 157). 
Mr. \Vardell testified that he turned on his 
left turn signal device before approaching the in-
tersection of Springview Drive and 7th East (R. 
164, 177, 178). He first observed the Jerman ve-
hicle in the left turn lane traveling north ( R. 163, 
177), but did not observe it further until just be-
fore impact ( R. 177). He estimated his speed at 
approximately 35 miles per hour (R. 166). Mr. 
Wardell activated his turn signal before the inter-
section of Springview Drive and 7th East, not be-
cause he intended to go east on Springview Drive, 
but because he intended to turn east on 33rd South 
Street (R. 166). 33rd South Street was a full three-
quarter to a block away from Springview Drive 
(R. 155, 166). Mr. Wardell saw the defendants' 
vehicle approaching before he turned on his left-
turn signal and before reaching the intersection of 
Springview Drive (R. 17, 178). He estimated the 
speed of the Wardell vehicle at between 5 and 6 
miles per hour at the time of impact. With specific 
reference to keeping a lookout for defendants' truck, 
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he testified on direct examination in response to a 
question from his own counsel ( R. 182) : 
"Q. And did you see this defendant's truck 
at any time between the time where it had 
arrived near the end of the island for the left 
turn that he was in and the time that he put 
himself in front of you on the highway? 
A. No. I did not. 
Q. Now, as you were proceeding at that rate 
of speed, why didn't you keep your eyes con-
stantly on the wdefendant's truck? 
A. I was watching for my left-hand turn 
lane up on 33rd South, and the traffic." 
The defendant David A. Jerman testified that 
he was driving a 1964 Ford pickup truck on the 
way to the library to obtain a book ( R. 202, 204). 
As he was traveling north on Seventh East, he en-
tered the left-turn lane to turn west onto Spring-
\'iew Drive ( R. 203). He shifted gears from third 
to second, and slowed to about 15 miles per hour as 
he entered the left-turn lane (R. 204) He first saw 
the appellant's vehicle before it entered the inter-
section of Springview Drive and 7th East, at a point 
where the southbound left-turn lane begins (for 
eastbound traffic), north of the intersection (R. 
205). From where he first saw the appellant's ve-
hicle, there was sufficient evidence to conclude 
that it could have made a left-hand turn easter-
ly onto Springview Drive. Thereafter, he did 
not see the vehicle until the accident (R. 206). 
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After the Court instructed the jury, appel-
lant took exceptions to the Court's failure to give 
certain requested instructions, but assigned no 
grounds as a basis for the exception, nor did he in-
dicate in the record the need for any such instruc-
tions ( R. 221, 222). No exception was taken to the 
Court's instructions on any general basis that they 
were confusing, excessive, or weighted in favor of 
the respondents, now assigned as error on appeal. 
Based upon the above evidence, the jury re-
turned a general verdict of no cause of action. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE ISSUE OF APPELLANTS' NEGLIGENCE 
WAS PROPERLY SUBMITTED TO THE JURY. 
The appellant contends that the decision of the 
trial court must be reversed because ( 1) there is 
no evidence that any action on the part of the ap-
pellant or her husband was a contributing cause to 
the accident, and ( 2) that the evidence discloses 
that the actions of the respondent David A. J errnan 
were the sole and proximate cause of the accident. 
The respondents submit that the appellant's con-
tention is without merit. The only question that 
need be convassed on this appeal is whether there 
was any negligence on the part of the appellant or 
her husband that could have contributed to cause 
the accident. Thus, the appellant is asking this Court 
to reverse the jury's verdict and to rule as a matter 
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of law that the respondent's negligence, if any, was 
the sole and proximate cause of the accident. 
In Coombs v. Perry, 2 Utah 2d 381, 383; 285 
P.2d 680 (1954), this Court observed, with refer-
ence t" the rule regarding its review of a trial 
court's decision to submit a matter of fact to the 
jury's determination, and the subsequent jury ver-
dict: 
"The basis of defendant's appeal is that the 
evidence so conclusively supports his views as 
to these two points that the court was requir-
ed to so rule as a matter of law and should 
not have submitted the matter to the jury. 
The plaintiff having won a judgment below, 
the verdict is protected by a bulwark of rules 
firmly established in our law. First, by the 
general proposition that the judgment and 
proceedings in the lower court are presump-
tively correct with the burden upon defend-
ant to show error. Second, where a trial judge 
has passed upon a question and a jury, pre-
sumably fair and impartial, has made a find-
ing, while such is not controlling, it is at least 
entitled to some consideration and should not 
be wholly ignored in reviewing the situation. 
"'and attempting to see, as objectively as pos-
sible, whether reasonably minds might so con-
clude. Third, that the court must review the 
evidence, together with every inference fair-
ly arising therefrom, in the light most favor-
able to the plaintiff, and similarly, must con-
sider any lack or failure of evidence in the 
same light, which we do in reviewing the facts 
here." 
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It has long been the rule in this State that a 
decision of a trial court in refusing to rule that a 
party was negligent as a matter of law will not be 
distributed on appeal, unless, under the facts taken 
in a light most favorable to the trial court's deter-
mination, it appears no reasonable man could but 
conclude otherwise. Jensen v. Dolen, 12 Utah 2d 404, 
367 P.2d 191 ( 1962); Mulbach v. Hertig, 15 Utah 
2d 121, 388 P.2d 414 ( 1964) ; Toomer's Estate v. 
Union Pacific R.R. Co., 121 Utah 37, 239 P.2d 163. 
With spec~fic reference to the question of 
whether or not the conduct of the appellant and her 
husband was of such a nature as to render them 
contributorily negligent, this Court has indicated 
several times under similar circumstances that the 
question is one for the jury. Spackman v. Carson, 
117 Utah 380, 216 P.2d 640 (1950); Jensen v. Tay-
lor, 2 Utah 2d 196, 271 P.2d 838 ( 1954). Conse-
quently, this Court would be justified in reversing 
the verdict only where if it could be determined as 
a matter of law that no reasonable juror could have 
concluded that the appellant or her husband was 
contributorily negligent. In reaching such a deter-
mination, the appellant would have to rley upon the 
evidence when taken in a light most favorable to 
the jury's verdict. The appellant simply has been 
unwilling to apply that standard in her brief. 
Further, the facts that appear of record in 
this case support a finding that Mr. Wardell 
was negligent, and indeed, that Beth Wardell 
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was, herself, negligent. Further, even if Mrs. War-
dell was not negligent, it is submitted that under the 
facts of the case, the negligence of her husband 
should be 'imputed to her. The latter issue will be 
canvassed in a subsequent point in this Brief. 
The evidence showed that Mrs. Wardell saw 
David Jerman when he started to turn into the 
left-hand lane ( R. 139). In her deposition, she testi-
fied that she had seen the defendant Jerman as 
he turned into the left-hand collection lane to turn 
west onto Springview Drive (R. 138). Prior to ap-
proaching the intersection between 7th East and 
Springview Drive, Mr. Wardell had turned his left-
turn signal on. The left-turn collection lane on 7th 
East to turn east onto Springview Drive was three-
quarters of a block in length, substantially longer 
than the shorter lane to turn west onto Springview 
Drive. The longer collection lane gave rise to the be-
lief by Mr. Jerman that Mr. Wardell intended to 
pull over into the left-hand collection lane to turn 
east onto Springview Drive because he was in posi-
tion and had time to do so (R. 210, 211, 214). Addi-
tionally, it should be remembered that the accident 
was at approximately 6 :44 p.m. (R. 156), and that 
the lights on most vehicles, including that of the 
defendant David Jerman, were on. Under these 
circumstances, the jury could reasonably have found 
that the clear vision of the defendant might have 
been impaired and that Mr. Jerman was misled into 
believing it was the intention of Mr. Wardell, who 
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had activated his left-turn signal, to pull over into 
the left-hand collection lane and turn in front of 
him. Indeed, that is substantially the testimony of 
M1·. Jerman (R. 208-209, 210-211). The jury was 
also entitled to believe that Mrs. Wardell's deposi-
tion impeached her credibility, that she saw the 
defendant Jerman enter the left-hand turn lane, 
and also that her husband had turned on his 
left-turn signal prior to reaching the intersec-
tion of Springview Drive and 7th East, almost a 
block before a left turn was necessary. Still she said 
nothing, and really didn't watch the defendant's 
vehicle. The jury could have concluded that a reason-
able person would have advised her husband of the 
approaching vehicle, especially in view of the fact 
that he had his left-turn signal on which could cer-
tainly have misled the aproaching vehicle. 
The testimony of Mr. Wardell demonstrates 
that he was contributorily negligent. He did not see 
the defendant's truck at any time between the time 
it arrived near the end of the island, even though he 
had previously observed it, and the moment of im-
pact (R. 163, 177, 182). Instead of observing traffiG 
near him, he was watching for traffic on 33rd 
South, although 33rd South was some distance away 
(R. 182). This becomes important, because Mr. War-
dell had previously indicated that he saw the de-
fendant's vehicle as it entered the left-turn lane and 
observed that it had its left-turn signal on. Under 
these circumstances, a reasonable person should have 
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known that in view of the long left turn collection 
lane on Mr. Wardell's side of the road, that an ap-
proaching vehicle could be misled as to his inten-
tions. Still, Wardell was looking far to the south 
towards an intersection from which he was still 
nearly a block away. Under these circumstances, the 
jury could have reasonably concluded that Mr. War-
tlell had failed to keep a reasonable lookout and had 
failed to keep a view of the traffic near him in order 
to prevent the very collision that occurred. Further, 
the jury could have reasonably found that Mr. 
Wardell, had he kept a lookout, would have realized 
the danger involved in sufficient time to have avoid-
ed the collision. Under these circumstances, the 
jury's finding that Mr. W ardell's conduct was a 
contributing cause to the accident is fully supported 
by the record. 
The appellant contends that, since Mr. Wardell 
gave a signal prior to the time that he was intending 
to turn and prior to the 100 foot limitation set out 
in Section 41-6-69 (b), Utah Code Annotated 
( 1953), that he did everything that the law requir-
ed. This, of course, begs the question. Mr. Wardell 
was a substantial distance away from the intersec-
tion where he intended to turn. He turned on his 
left-turn signal prior to the time he reached the in-
tersection of 7th East and Springview Drive, and 
at such a time that the defendant felt Mr. Wardell 
had ample time to pull over into the left-turn collec-
tion lane and make a turn east onto Springview 
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Drive (R. 210, 211). Further, the actions of Mr. 
Wardell hardly constitute compliance with the spirit 
of the statute. Sectio n41-6-69(b), Utah Code Anno-
tated, ( 1953), is undoubtedly intended to give an 
ample warning to a driver approaching the vehicle 
giving the signal, or a driver behind the vehicle giv-
ing the signal, that a turn in intended. If the signal 
to turn is made at a distance unrelated to the place 
of the intended turn, it could indeed be confusing. 
Under the interpretation that the appellant pro-
poses, had Mr. Wardell turned his signal on at 4th 
South and 7th East preparatory to turning on 33rd 
South and 7th East in Salt Lake City, he would not 
be negligent because he would have complied with 
the letter of the statute requiring a signal at a dis-
tance of at least 100 feet prior to the turn. Such 
an interpretation is unwarranted. 
In Prosser, Torts, 3rd Edition, P.205, dealing 
with compliance with a statute, it is stated: 
"Where the violation of a criminal statute is 
negligence it does not follow that compliance 
with it is always due care." 
Further, with reference to Mr. Wardell's failure 
to keep an appropriate lookout, Prosser notes: 
"Thus the requirement of a hand signal on a 
left turn does not mean that the Legislature 
has conferred immunity on the driver who is 
otherwise negligent in making the turn and 
that he is absolved from all obligation to slow 
down, keep a proper lookout and proceed with 
reasonable care." 
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By the same token, the fact that Mr. Wardell 
had turned on his signal 100 feet before the inter-
section at which he was intending to turn, or 100 
feet prior to the time he intended to change lanes, 
does not mean that he exercised due care in every 
other respect. His failure to keep a proper lookout 
for approaching vehicles and his failure to continue 
to observe the defendant's vehicle after he first ob-
served it moving into the left-hand turn lane was 
a sufficient basis for a finding of contributory negl-
gence by the jury. Also, the nature of the statute 
and its intended purpose must be considered in de-
termining whether or not compliance with it should 
be deemed to absolve Mr. Wardell from any further 
responsibility. Obviously, the statute was intended 
to give warning to other drivers that a turn was 
imminent, so as to allow them to keep a safe distance 
and to be on guard for hazards involved in the im-
pending turn. When Mr. Wardell gave his signal 
far beyond the time that he intended to turn, a 
reasonable man could have concluded that he in-
tended to turn at the intersection nearest to the 
one he was then approaching. His failure to use 
circumspection at the time he gave a signal to turn 
was negligence, and the defendant was lulled into 
a reasonable belief that a left turn was imminent on 
the part of the Wardell vehicle. Thus, Mr. Wardell's 
conduct contributed to the cause of the accident. In 
addition, Mrs. Wardell had ample opportunity to 
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advise her husband of the danger that was being 
spawned by a premature left turn signal. 
In Mulbach v. Hertig, 15 Utah 2d 121, 388 P.2d 
414 ( 1964) , the Supreme Court acknowledged that 
an individual driving on an arterial highway ap-
proaching an intersection was also "obliged to be 
alert to other possible dangers on the street, and 
particularly at the intersection." See also Martin 
v. Ste'oens, 121 Utah 484, 243 P.2d 747. The Court 
also observed that the question of negligence, proxi-
mate cause and contributory negligence were for 
the jury. 
In Anderson 'V. Strack, 236 Iowa 1, 17 N.W.2d 
719 ( 1945), the Iowa Supreme Court indicated that 
where an individual gave a signal to make a left 
hand turn and then turned right that his negligence 
could be assumed as a contributing cause of the 
accident. In the present case, Mr. Wardell gave a 
signal of an impending left turn at an approaching 
intersection and then continued on through the in-
tersection. Under these circumstances, the jury 
could reasonably conclude that Mr. Wardell's ac-
tions were negligent, and that his wife had suffi· 
cient time to apprise him of the possible dangers and 
therefore failed to take reasonable precautions for 
her own safety. See also Hickok v. Skinner, 113 
Utah 1, 190 P.2d 514 ( 1948). 
In Beck v. Jeppesen, 1 Utah 2d 127, 262 P.2d 
760 ( 1953), the Utah Supreme Court ruled that a 
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vehicular collision occurring at an intersection pre-
sented a jury question of whether the motorist was 
contributorily negligent. The Court noted that the 
duty imposed upon a motorist approaching an in-
tersection is one of due care under the circum-
stances. Consequently, it is apparent that under the 
facts of the instant case, the question of proximate 
cause and of the contributory negligence of the ap-
pellant, or her husband, was one of fact for the 
jury. Hess v. Robinson, 109 Utah 60, 163 P.2d 510; 
Bullock v. Luke, 98 Utah 501, 98 P.2d 350. 
Under the facts of this case, Mr. Wardell's 
conduct could be imputed to his wife thus preclud-
ing Mrs. Wardell's claim for relief. Further, the 
conduct of Mrs. Wardell all the circumstances, in-
cluding th fact that she was the owner of the ve-
hicle, and presumptively had control of the vehicle, 
Fox v. Lavender, 89 Utah 115, 56 P2d 1049 (1936), 
was such that the jury could have properly conclud-
ed that she had failed to keep an appropriate look-
out for her own safety and exercise the control over 
the operation of the vehicle that she was entitled to. 
Therefore, it cannot be said as a matter of law that 
the verdict of the jury was improper. 
The appellant's contention that the defendants' 
actions were the sole and proximate cause of the 
accident cannot be sustained. An individual making 
a left turn has a duty to keep a proper lookout, and 
not to make the intended turn under circumstances 
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which will endanger approaching vehicles. Also, 
an individual app1·oaching an intersection has 
a duty to keep a p1·oper lookout and to exer-
cise due caution under circumstances indicating 
an impending left turn. Sni,ith v. Gallegos, 16 Utah 
2d 344, 400 P.2d 570 ( 1963) ; Burkhalter v. Gran-
deur Homes, 17 Utah 2d 278, 409 P.2d 614 (1966). 
Under these circumstances, there is no basis for 
reversal on the contention that the sole cause 
of the accident were the actions of the defendant 
David A. Jerman, or that the conduct of the appel-
lant or her husband was not a contributing cause to 
the accident. 
POINT II. 
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO ALLOW 
THE JURY TO CONCLUDE (A) THAT BETH M. WAR-
DELL WAS THE OWNER OF THE VEHICLE DRIVEN 
BY HER HUSBAND AND PRESUMPTIVELY HAD 
CONTROL OVER IT AND (B) THAT THE APPEL-
LANT'S HUSBAND WAS OPERA TING THE APPEL-
LANT'S VEHICLE AS HER AGENT AT THE TIME 
OF THE ACCIDENT AND THAT HIS CONTRIBUTORY 
NEGLIGENCE WAS IMPUTABLE TO HER. 
A 
The respondents submit that the facts of this 
case demonstrate circumstances sufficient to war-
rant the jury to find that Mrs. Wardell had control 
over the vehicle in which she was riding and that 
Mr. Wardell was her agent. By Mrs. Wardell's own 
testimony the vehicle was registered in her name, 
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( K 118, 159 and she made the arrangements for 
the loan to purchase the vehicle ( R. 161, 162) . At 
the time of her deposition, she testified that the ve-
hicle was hers and her husband indicated that the 
vehicle was hers. ( Depo. Mrs. Wardell, p. 26, R. 
169-170; Depo. Mrs. Wardell, p. 31, R. 170-171). 
Further, Mrs. Wardell and her husband both in-
dicated that normally her husband drove a pickup 
truck and she drove the automobile in which she 
was riding at the time of the accident. Mrs. War-
dell was a woman of some independence, owning 
and operating a mink ranch ( R. 136). It is sub-
mitted under the facts of this case and the circum-
stances surrounding the ownership of the vehicle 
that the jury could have properly concluded that 
Mrs. Wardell had control of or had the right to 
control of the vehicle. 
In the case of Fox v. Lavender, 89 Utah 115, 
56 P.2d 1049 (1936), this Court rulesd: 
"We believe that the better rule is that where 
an owner is an occupant of his own care there 
arises rebuttable presumption that he has con-
trol and direction of it. It is not as if he were 
absent as in the case of McFarlane v. Winters, 
supra, where this court refused to indulge in 
presumption. A person being conveyed by his 
own vehicle is presmued to control his own 
property in his own transportation. More-
over, as a practical matter the rule is a salu-
tary one. A person injured by the negligence 
of the driver ordinarily cannot know the real 
relationship between the driver and the pas-
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senger owner. They may not know it them-
selves. If the presumption of agency is in-
dulged, it throws upon the proper parties the 
burden of producing evidence to negative the 
relationship rather than upon the plaintiff 
to produce evidence to prove it." 
The Court further stated: 
"* * * when the sole owner is present in the 
car and another is driving, it is presumed 
without more being shown, that the sole own~ 
er has the right of control, and that the driver 
is driving for him, that is, as his agent. If 
two or more joint owners are in the car, they 
will be presumed, without more shown, to 
have joint right of control and therefore the 
driver will be presumed to be driving for 
himself and as the agent of the other present 
joint owners.' 
Consequently, under the decision of Fox v. Laven-
der, it was presumed that Mrs. Wardell had control 
of the vehicle and that her husband was acting as 
her agent. No testimony was introduced which 
rebutted this presumption. 'The facts of this case 
justify a determination of her right to control the 
vehicle; first, on the grounds that she was the sole 
owner of the vehicle, and second, even if the evidence 
is taken in a light most favorable to the appellant, 
she was at least a co-owner. 
In Donaghue v. Hayden, 58 Cal. App. 457, 208 
P. 1007 ( 1922), the California Supreme Court, in 
a fact situation very comparable to the instant one, 
ruled that where a husband was operating the ve-
20 
hicle owned by the wife at the time the accident 
occurred, the wife being present in the vehicle, the 
parties having been to town to obtain tobacco for 
the husband and pigeon feed for the wife's pigeons 
on a farm owned by her, that a jury verdict deny-
ing her recovery for her injuries would be sus-
tained, and the husband's negligence would be im-
puted to the wife. 
In Nielsen v. Watanabe, 90 Utah 401, 62 P.2d 
11 7 ( 1936) , this Oourt affirmed the decision in 
Fox v. Lavender. In that case, an action was brought 
by the wife of a motorist against a truck driver al-
leging that she sustained injuries while riding in an 
automobile driven by her husband, jointly owned 
by both of them, when it was involved in a collision 
with the truck driver. This Court stated: 
"The case of Fox v. Lavender, 89 Utah 115, 
56 P. (2d) 1049, 1060, is authority for the 
doctrine that: 
'If two or more joint owners are in the 
care, they will be presumed, without 
more shown, to have joint right of con-
trol and therefore the driver will be pre-
sumed to be driving for himself and as 
the agent of the other present joint own-
ers.' 
"The allegations of plaintiff's complaint 
brings her within the foregoing rule. She al-
leged that at the time complained of she was 
riding in an automobile jointly ~wned by ~er 
and her husband. The automobile was bemg 
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d1·iven by he1· husband. Nothing is alleged 
in the complaint which takes her out of the 
general rule. Under the facts alleged by her 
she was responsible for the negligence, if any, 
of her husband." 
A similar result was reached by the Supreme Court 
of Minnesota in Martin v. Schiska, 183 Minnesota 
256, 236 N.W. 312 ( 1931). 
Consequently, it is submitted that under the facts 
of this case the jury was warranted in finding, on 
the basis of the presumption alone, that Mrs. 
Wardell had right to control the vehicle and that 
her husband was driving the vehicle as her agent. 
Neither presumption was rebutted. Further, it is 
submitted that since the right to control was pre-
sumed, that since Mrs. Wardell saw the respondent's 
vehicle as it approached the left turn lane and 
knew, or should have known, that her husband had 
his turn signal on before Springview Drive, she 
could have taken measures to have prevented the acci-
dent. Therefore, it is submitted that her husband's 
negligence is imputable to Mrs. Wardell, and fur-
ther, that her own independent negligence would 
deny her recovery. 
B 
Under the facts of this case there is a suffi-
cient showing of actual agency upon which to sus-
tain the jury's apparent determination that Mr. 
Wardell was acting as an agent on behalf of his 
wife. In addition to the legal presumption of con-
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trnl, the facts of this case clearly disclose that Mr. 
Wardell was in fact acting as his wife's agent in 
operating the vehicle. First, the trip into Salt Lake 
was solely for Mrs. W ardell's purposes. She went 
to the Wes tern Union office in order to send her 
son by a prior marriage a gift of money for his 
birthday. Second, Mr. Wardell was not going 
in the first instance but thereafter changed his 
mind and went. Consequently, there was no evidence 
at all that there was any other purpose to be served 
by his going and driving the vehicle other than for 
Mrs. Wardell's benefit. Third, Mrs. Wardell drove 
the vehicle into town, got out of the vehicle to go 
into the Western Union ofice and Mr. Wardell found 
the parking place. Thereafter, she returned to the 
vehicle and got in the passenger side. There were 
no stops made on the way home and the route taken 
was directly back to the Wardell house. Mr. War-
dell's operation of the vehicle was purely for the 
benefit of his wife. This when coupled with evidence 
of the fact that the vehicle was the one normally 
Mrs. Wardell would drive, and one which she pur-
chased and which was registered in her name, points 
to the conclusion that the operation of the vehicle 
by Mr. Wardell was as the agent of Mrs. Wardell. 
At the outset, the respondents agree with the 
cases submitted in the brief of the appellant to the 
effect that agency does not arise solely from a hus-
band and wife relationship. These cases and the 
other cases cited in appellant's brief bear no rela-
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tionship to the facts of the instant case. It seems 
evident, however, f1~om the facts that appear of 
record would support a finding of actual agency 
sufficient to sustain the jury's verdict. In Fox v. 
Lavender, supra, this Court indicated that the li-
ability of a wife riding in an automobile driven by 
the husband, and jointly owned by both, on an 
errand f'or the wife was a question for the jury. 
It is recognized that the creation of a agency re-
lation depends upon a manifestation of consent by 
the principal. Restatement of Agency 2d § 15. How-
ever, it is well settled that the manifestation of the 
agency may be implied. Thus the Restatement of 
Agency 2d, § 26, states: 
"Except for the execution of instruments un-
der seal or the performance of transactions 
required by statute to be authorized in a par-
ticular way, authority to do an act can be 
created by written or spoken words or other 
conduct of the principal which, reasonably in-
terpreted, causes the agent to believe that the 
principal desires him to act on the principal's 
account." 
Section 27 of the Restatement of Agency 2d 
states: 
"'Except for the execution of instruments un-
der seal or the conduct of transactions re 
quired by statute to be authorized in a par-
ticular way, apparent authority to do an act 
is created as to a third person by written or 
spoken words or by any conduct of the prin-
cipal which, reasonab~y interpreted, .cal!ses 
the third person to believe that the principal 
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consents to having the act done on his behalf 
by the person purporting to act for him." 
Under these circumstances where the husband 
was operating the vehicle on behalf of the wife's 
interests, the whole trip was for the purpose 
of accommodating the wife's interests, and where 
the wife had presumed control over the vehicle, an 
agency relationship was established which would 
allow imputation of the husband's negligence to the 
wife. Prosser, Torts, 3rd Edition, P. 479-480. 
Based upon the above facts showing the prin-
cipal-agent relationship, this case is controlled by 
the doctrine of Fox v. Lavender, and the jury ver-
dict should be sustained on the grounds that Mr. 
Wardell's negligence was imputable to his wife on 
the theory of agency. 
POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR TO THE PRE-
.JUDICE OF THE APPELLANT IN FAILING TO GIVE 
INSTRUCTIONS REQUESTED BY THE APPELLANT 
SINCE THEY WERE EITHER INAPPLICABLE OR 
OTHERWISE COVERED BY INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN 
BY THE COURT. 
The appellant contends that the trial court com-
mitted error in failing to give her requested instruc-
tions. Appellant's requested instruction No. 4 asked 
the Court to instruct the jury that there was no 
evidence that the appellant was guilty of contribu-
tory negligence and therefore this should not be 
deemed an issue in the case. Of course, from the 
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facts of the case and what has been heretofore been 
set forth in this brief, it is apparent that the trial 
court acted properly in giving the instruction on 
contributory negligence and in rejecting the appel-
lant's request for an instruction that the matter was 
not in issue. The appellant contends that the failure 
of the Court to give an instruction that the negli-
gence of the appellant's husband could not be im-
puted to her was error. As has been heretofore noted, 
it was proper for the jury to find imputation of 
the driver's negligence to the appellant, and con-
sequently, the Court did not commit error in failing 
to give such an instruction. 
The appellant contends that Instruction No. 8 
( R-93), should have been given by the court. It 
should be noted that the Court indicated that the in-
struction framed by the appellant was "covered in 
part". An examination of the record ( R-93) reveals 
that Instruction No. 24 as given by the Court ade-
quately covered the theory of the appellant. Indeed 
the instruction posed by the appellant was not com-
pletely correct. An individual cannot be charged With 
negligence in complying with a statute if there is a 
mandatory duty to do so unless it is reasonably fore-
seeable that harm would arise from the compliance 
and a reasonable prudent man would disregard the 
statute in an effort to avoid harm to others or to 
himself. However, in this case, the application of 
the statute was not involved. Here was a situation 
where the facts indicated that Mr. Wardell turned 
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his blinker on long before it was necessary in order 
to make an appropriate change of lanes or to turn 
up 33rd South. His blinker was on under circum-
stances which could have mislead a reasonable pru-
dent man. The instruction of the court adequately 
appraised the jury of the law on giving a signal 
before making a turn or changing lanes. There is 
no requirement that instruction be given by the 
court in the precise language posed by either party. 
If the instruction given by the court accurately deals 
with the law of the case, the mere fact that one 
party would have preferred different language is 
no basis to contend error on appeal. The instruction 
given by the court satisfied the law of the case, and 
therefore, there was no error in the court giving 
the instruction it gave and refusing to give instruc-
tion No. 8 requested by the appellant in the exact 
language requested. 
Instruction No. 9, as proffered by the appel-
lant, was an instruction to the effect that Mr. Jer-
man was not justified in assuming that the vehicle 
in which Mrs. Wardell was riding might make a 
left turn at the intersection of 3190 South 7th East. 
This instruction would in effect have ruled as a 
matter of law that the conduct of the driver of the 
\Vardell vehicle was not negligence which could have 
contributed to the cause of the accident. On the con-
trary, at the time Mr. Jerman saw the Wardell 
vehicle he testified there was still sufficient time 
' for it to pull into the left hand lane and make a 
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left hand turn. Since the turn signal was on, it was 
reasonable for Mr. Jerman to conclude that the 
Wardell vehicle intended to make a turn at the near-
est intersection. Under these circumstances, the in-
struction requested by the appellant was contrary 
to the law necessary for appropriate decision in the 
case and would have withdrawn from the jury a 
part of defendant's theory of the case. There is 
nothing in Section 41-6-66, Utah Code Annotated . 
1953, (left turn statute) which directs the court to 
otherwise advise the jury than the way it did in 
tllis case. The statute is inapplicable to the proposi-
tion for which the appellant urges. Further instruc-
tion 24 given by the Court covered the statutory ' 
language in Section 41-6-66. 
Appellant also assigns as error the failure to 
give requested instruction No. 10 (R-95). It should 
be noted again that the trial judge indicated that he 
had covered that instruction in part in his instruc-
tions to the jury. The 'instruction is argumentatively 
framed and not in accordance with the deci-
sion of this Court in Fox v. Lavender, supra. In-
struction No. 26 as given by the court ( R-42, 44) 
appraised the jury of the law applicable to the 
case regarding the possible agency of Mr. War-
dell and the necessity of finding the right to control 
in the appellant. Under these circumstances, there 
could have been no error from the failure to give 
the instruction requested by the appellant. The in-
struction as given complies adequately with the rec-
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ommended instruction in Jury Instruction Forms 
Utah 10.7 and the decision of this Court in Fox v. 
Lavender, supra. 
Finally, the appellant contends that the court 
should have given requested instruction No. 11 
which deals with the duty of proper look out (R-
96). It should also be noted that Judge Anderson 
indicated concerning that instruction that it was 
covered in part. Instruction No. 19, as given by the 
court, when read in conjunction with Instruction 
No. 18, clearly satisfies the obligation of the Court 
to advise the jury on the respondent J erman's duty 
to keep a proper lookout. The instructions giv-
en by the Court complied with the decision of 
this Court in Smith v. Gallegos, 16 Utah 2d 344, 
400 P.2d 570 (1965), and Burkhalter v. Grandeur 
Homes, 17 Utah 2d 278, 409 P.2d 614 (1966). 
When the instructions given by the court are 
appraised as a whole, they adequately advised the 
jury as to the applicable law of the case and ap-
pellant's assignments of error are without merit. 
POINT IV. 
THE INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN BY THE COURT 
WERE NOT UNNECESSARY, CONFUSING, OR IN-
APPROPRIATE. 
The appellant, in the final Point of her Brief, 
contends that the instructions given by the Court 
were voluminous, inconsistent and confusing, and 
that consequently reversal is in order. 
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At the outset, it should be noted that immedi-
ately after the instructions were given, the trial 
court asked the parties to take any exceptions to 
the instructions they may have. No exceptions were 
taken by the appellant on the grounds that the in-
structions were inconsistent or confusing, or unduly 
voluminous or repititious. Indeed, the exceptions to 
the instructions taken by the appellant concerned 
the refusal of the court to give particular instruc-
tions and at no time did the appellant except on 
the broad basis she now assigns as error before 
this Court. 
In Hill v. Cloward, 14 Utah 2d 55, 377 P.2d 
186 ( 1962), this Court noted that the purpose of 
taking exceptions to the instructions was to permit 
corection to be made before the matter was sub-
mitted to the jury and to lay a foundation for pos-
sible reversal by the losing party on appeal. In the 
present case, the failure to take the exception at the 
appropriate time precludes the appellant from con-
tending that the instructions were improper for 
the reasons now assigned. Eniployers Mutual Lia-
bility Insurance Co. Of Wisconsin v. Allen Oil Com-
pany, 133 Utah 253, 258 P.2d 445 (1953). 
Additionally, it is submitted that there is no 
merit to the appellant's contention that the instruc-
tions were so voluminous and inconsistent as to 
confuse the jury. The mere fact that 37 instructions 
were given does not mean that the instructions were 
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necessarily voluminous. Indeed, a good number of 
them were form instructions, dealing with general 
obligations of jurors and the presumptions and evi-
dentiary standards to be applied. Instructions 1 
through 13 fit generally into that category. Instruc-
tions concerning damages were necessary to present 
appellant's right of recovery in the event liability 
was found, as were instructions on the appropriate 
means of balloting, credibility of witnesses and com-
parable matters (See Instructions 33 through 37). 
Thus, only a hard core number of instructions on 
the actual issues of the case were given by the Court. 
The appellant contends that the instruction on 
contributory negligence were unnecessary. We sub-
mit what has been said before in this Brief refutes 
this contention. The appellant's contention that 
counsel made appropriate exception is not sustained 
by the record. He made individual exceptions to the 
failure to give his instruction, and did not assign 
sufficient grounds to his exception. 
The decision of Taylor v. Johnson, 15 Utah 2d 
342, 393 P.2d 382 ( 1963), is inapplicable to this 
case. The Johnson case dealt with an entirely differ-
ent factual situation where instructions were in-
ordinately long, far longer than those in this case, 
where the issues were complex and the instructions 
were found to be heavily weighted to one particular 
side. The instructions were consistently couched in 
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language favorable to one party. The instructions 
given by the court in this case bear no resemblance 
whatsoever to the instructions condemned in the 
Johnson case. 
In Johnson v. Cornwall Warehouse Co., 16 Utah 
2d 186, 398 P.2d 24 ( 1965), this Court affirmed 
the decision of the jury in an automobile accident 
case. In doing so, the court noted that there were 
50 different 'instructions given and that some were 
very long, repititious and contained legal terms 
with complicated definitions. Such was not the case 
here. Even so, in the Cornwall Warehouse case this 
Court affirmed the decision of the trial court find-
ing that at best the claim was harmless error. The 
instructions given in this case, when viewed as a 
whole, properly met the issues raised at the time 
of rtial and provide no basis for reversal. Manning 
v. Powers, 117 Utah 310, 215 P.2d 396. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant was given a fair opportunity to con-
vince a jury of her peers that she was entitled to 
compensation for alleged injuries sustained in an 
automobile accident with the respondent David 
Jerman. Full factual inquiry 'into the case was made 
with each party presenting its view of the evidence. 
The jury was adequately instructed by the trial 
court. The jury considering the facts determined 
that there was no claim for relief on behalf of the 
appellant. The errors that the appellant now assigns 
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as a basis for reversal have no legal merit and ap-
proach the frivolous. The conclusion seeking re-
versal by this Court set forth in the appellant's 
brief, no matter how poetic, overlooks the simple 
fact that under traditional law in this country the 
decision of a jury will not be set aside unless there 
was clear prejudice to one party, or the determina-
tion by the jury is wholly unreasonable. Neither of 
these criteria are met in this case. There is no basis 
for reversal and this Court should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HANSON & BALDWIN 
909 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for 
Defendants-Respondents 
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